Bonus
A 2011 paper by Gregory Egorov and Konstantin Sonin used game theory to show that dictators’ advisors exhibit a “tradeoff” between competence and this trait. For 10 points each:
[10m] Name this trait. It ends the title of a book in which Albert O. Hirschman wrote that critics within an organization may use the strategies of Exit or Voice.
ANSWER: loyalty [accept loyalty-competence tradeoff; accept Exit, Voice, and Loyalty]
[10e] The paper imagines a dictator drafting one of these agreements for a vizier. In common law, these things are enforceable only if they involve an offer and an acceptance.
ANSWER: contracts [accept incentive contracts]
[10h] Egorov and Sonin argue that “less sure succession leads to less competent agents” because the dynamic game has a unique one of these solutions, in which each player’s best response depends only on payoff-relevant variables in the current state, not the game’s full history.
ANSWER: Markov perfect equilibrium [or Markov perfect Nash equilibrium; prompt on subgame perfect equilibrium; prompt on Nash equilibrium; prompt on Markovian equilibrium or Markovian strategies; prompt on memoryless Nash equilibrium by asking “that trait is usually present in what type of equilibria?”]
<Social Science>
Answerlines and category may not exactly match the version played at all sites
Conversion
| Team | Opponent | Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3 | Total | Parts |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| British Columbia | Arizona State | 10 | 10 | 0 | 20 | ME |
| Chicago A | Indiana | 10 | 10 | 0 | 20 | ME |
| Columbia B | Ohio State | 0 | 10 | 0 | 10 | E |
| Florida | WUSTL B | 10 | 10 | 0 | 20 | ME |
| Georgia State | Penn State | 0 | 10 | 0 | 10 | E |
| Iowa State | Harvard | 10 | 10 | 0 | 20 | ME |
| Johns Hopkins | Texas | 0 | 10 | 0 | 10 | E |
| Michigan | Illinois B | 0 | 10 | 0 | 10 | E |
| Minnesota | MIT | 0 | 10 | 0 | 10 | E |
| North Carolina B | Winona State | 0 | 10 | 0 | 10 | E |
| Northwestern | Rutgers | 10 | 10 | 0 | 20 | ME |
| Ottawa | NYU | 0 | 10 | 0 | 10 | E |
| RIT | Maryland | 10 | 10 | 0 | 20 | ME |
| Toronto A | Columbia A | 10 | 10 | 0 | 20 | ME |
| Toronto B | Georgia Tech | 0 | 10 | 0 | 10 | E |
| Toronto C | Cornell A | 0 | 10 | 0 | 10 | E |
| UC Berkeley A | Stanford | 0 | 10 | 0 | 10 | E |
| Vanderbilt | Cornell B | 10 | 10 | 0 | 20 | ME |
| Virginia | UCF | 10 | 10 | 0 | 20 | ME |
| Virginia Tech | Chicago B | 0 | 10 | 0 | 10 | E |
| WUSTL A | North Carolina A | 10 | 10 | 0 | 20 | ME |
| Waterloo A | Illinois A | 10 | 10 | 0 | 20 | ME |
| Waterloo B | UC Berkeley B | 10 | 10 | 0 | 20 | ME |
| Yale | LSE | 0 | 10 | 0 | 10 | E |
Summary
| Tournament | Exact Match? | Heard | PPB | Easy % | Medium % | Hard % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 ACF Nationals | Yes | 24 | 15.00 | 100% | 50% | 0% |